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Abstract 
Several emerging study has focused on the pricing issue of bandwidth sharing between WiFi and 
WiMAX networks; however, most of them either concentrate on the design of collaborated protocols 
or figure out the issue without the overall consideration of customer preference and contract design. 
In the present study, we consider a wireless service market in which there are two wireless service 
providers operating WiFi and WiMAX, respectively. One of the research dimensions given in the 
study is whether wireless operators implement bandwidth sharing, while the other is whether wireless 
operators make decisions independently or jointly. By involving customer preference and wholesale 
price contract in the present model, we find that bandwidth sharing would benefit a WiMAX service 
provider, yet a WiFi service provider has no significant saving under a wholesale price contract. In 
addition, the profit of a WiMAX service may increase with WiFi coverage when bandwidth sharing is 
implemented but decease with WiFi coverage when both wireless services operate without bandwidth 
sharing. Besides, the WiMAX service provider would allocate more capacity when average usage rate 
increases, but decrease the amount of capacity when average usage rate is too large. 
Keywords: WiFi, WiMAX, Bandwidth Sharing, Service Strategy, Wholesale Price Contract 
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1 Introduction 
While wireless service providers are competitors for their market shares, they also 
collaboratively provide Internet connectivity. WiFi and WiMAX are the two most influential 
technologies that have been implemented by wireless service providers. WiFi technology is mostly 
used in laptops today and is commonly available in coffee shops and other public places around the 
world. The WiFi operators aggregate the wireless networks provided by micro carriers, such as 
Starbucks coffee-shops and Borders bookstores in the United States, and provide a single access to the 
end user (Yaiparoj et al., 2008). The main disadvantages of using WiFi network would be the lower 
coverage as it operates in public bands so that the wireless signals broadcasted by WiFi hotspots are 
so weak to avoid interference. On the other hand, WiMAX, an emerging technology, promises to offer 
data speeds faster than current 3G wireless networks and over much longer distances than comparably 
fast WiFi technology; hence, WiMAX can be considered a solution to fill holes in WiFi hotspots 
coverage and enable wireless connectivity on trains or buses (Ballon 2007). Currently, Sprint, a 
wireless company utilizing WiMAX to offer 4G service, has admitted that true download speeds are 
between 2M bps (bits per second) and 4M bps, comparable with many DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) 
and cable modem services. Besides, the company has committed itself to spending $5 billion on the 
WiMAX network. Consequently, its WiMAX coverage will be available to over 22 million potential 
customers by 2010.  As time passes by, the rates and terms for WiMAX services are fairly attractive 
and could put pressure on competitors (Reardon 2007, Lawson 2008, Myslewski 2009). 
Pricing and the features of transmission media affect the allocation of the wireless network 
resources between WiFi and WiMAX. Some of the wireless ISPs with financial power and high level 
of technology are big companies and are concentrated in urban metropolitan regions. Because of the 
limitation of coverage provided by a WiFi hotspot, a WiFi service provider has to allocate thousands 
of hotspots to reduce customer’s inconvenience cost of finding the nearest hotspot. Since each WiFi 
hotspot needs a wired backhaul to offer Internet connectivity, the capacity cost of WiFi services spent 
on wired backhauls can be saved if Internet connectivity is offered by a wireless backhaul, such as a 
WiMAX base station. The focus in recent years has been towards real-time data services in the 
wireless environment. Wireless service providers can charge users a service fee to influence their 
consumption decisions towards more efficient network usage. In general, wireless users are inherently 
time-sensitive and the aspects to coverage are highly subjective and depend heavily on user 
experiences. Thus, wireless service providers can rely on user network preferences and the 
characteristics of their own media to implement traffic management and versioning strategy by 
pricing their services accordingly. 
1.1 Research Problem 
It is practicable that WiMAX base stations can serve as wireless backhauls where the bandwidth 
of WiMAX networks is shared by WiFi access points to provide Internet connectivity to mobile WiFi 
customers (Fantacci and Tarchi 2006; Lin et al. 2009; Huang et al. 2010). From the aspect of 
practicability, the integration of WiFi and WiMAX can benefit WiFi service providers because costly 
wired infrastructure can be avoided. However, it is not clear that the impact of bandwidth sharing on 
wireless network providers’ service strategies. The market share of wireless Internet service is easily 
affected by price, transmission rate, and coverage; thus, this study emphasizes the service strategies 
universally adopted by a wireless service provider, such as how to allocate service capacity and how 
to determine service coverage. We find that bandwidth sharing would benefit a WiMAX service 
provider, yet a WiFi service provider has no significant saving under a wholesale price contract. In 
addition, the profit of a WiMAX service may increase with WiFi coverage when bandwidth sharing is 
implemented but decease with WiFi coverage when both wireless services operate without bandwidth 
sharing. The WiMAX service provider would allocate more capacity when average usage rate 
increases, but decrease the amount of capacity when average usage rate is too large. Finally, we also 
identify the difference in service strategies between channel competition and channel collaboration. 
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1.2 Research Architecture 
The present study can be split into four different scenarios which are shown in Table 1. The first 
dimension is whether WiFi and WiMAX services operate with bandwidth sharing or not. The 
WiMAX service provider can choose to offer the contract of bandwidth sharing or not. If the WiMAX 
operator does offer the contract, the WiFi service provider makes a take-it-or-leave-it decision. The 
other dimension is channel collaboration in which both wireless service providers can make their 
decisions independently or jointly. 
Table 1.  Research Architecture 
 
  Bandwidth Sharing 
  No Yes 
No (I) (II) 
Channel 
Collaboration 
Yes (III) (IV) 
2 Literature Review 
It is widely accepted that the Internet industry in the United States is a vertical structure which is 
composed of Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (Shin et al, 
2007). The relationship between IBPs and ISPs can be considered that of wholesalers and retailers and 
ISPs can independently pay IBPs a transit fee the for the Internet access. Recently, there are several 
emerging study focusing on the revenue and benefit in the integration of WiFi and WiMAX. 
Gunasekaran and Harmantzis (2006) propose a service model that uses WiFi and WiMAX to deliver 
cost-effective broadband services in which WiFi access points use WiMAX backhaul systems to 
lower infrastructure costs. Niyato et al. (2007) consider a single WiMAX base station with multiple 
connections from WiMAX customers and WiFi access points. In their setting, the WiMAX networks 
serve real-time traffic, while the WiFi networks serve best effort traffic. The authors show that the 
WiMAX service provider needs to increase the price charged to WiFi routers when the traffic arrival 
rate increases, in order to compensate for the loss in revenue due to the degraded QoS performance 
for customers using WiMAX services. Niyato et al. (2008) utilize two oligopolistic models for price 
competition among service providers in a heterogeneous wireless environment composed of WiMAX 
and WiFi access networks. Their research outcomes show that the WiMAX service provider can 
increase its offered price to gain a higher profit when the transmission quality becomes better. Maillé 
and Tuffin (2008) study a pricing game between two wireless access providers, one operating WiFi 
access and the other operating WiMAX access. Surprisingly, the authors find that the overall utility of 
the system is maximized at equilibrium. Ibrahim et al. (2009) provide tractable formulae of the end-
user mean capacity and coverage probability in order to properly dimension the integration of WiFi 
and WiMAX. Ognenoski et al. (2008) consider that a single service provider runs two wireless 
networks, including WiFi and WiMAX, and show how the mean utility, total system utility, and 
revenue change for a backup network offering voice and file download services.  
Our present study is different from extant researches by concentrating on the following 
dimensions. First, we rely on the aspect of customer perceptions to model user preference regarding 
transmission rate and coverage. Second, the WiFi and WiMAX service providers can make their 
pricing and service decisions independently or jointly. Third, we propose a wholesale price contract to 
solve the issue of bandwidth sharing between WiFi and WiMAX. 
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3 The Model 
In this study, we are interested in a more general case when there are demand for both WiFi and 
WiMAX. We consider a wireless service zone in which there are two wireless service providers 
operating different wireless technology, WiFi and WiMAX. The number of customers in the market 
who want to purchase wireless services is denoted as 0h . To offer access services, a WiFi service 
provider has to deploy a number of access points to cover most of the areas in which customers 
usually hang out. An access point is also known as a wireless router or hotspot. Similarly, WiMAX 
signals are broadcasted by a WiMAX base station, which works exactly like GSM network phones 
towers standing high up in the air to broadcast radio signals. We use Figure 1 to demonstrate the 
difference between WiFi and WiMAX. Both service providers charge customers a service fee for 
offering access services and customers choose preferred access services based on their utilities. The 
price of WiFi service is denoted as Fp while the price of WiMAX service is denoted as Mp . All 
notations used in the present model can be found in Table 2. 
 
Figure 1. The comparison between WiFi network and WiMAX network 
3.1 Channel Competition 
A well-known characteristic of Internet industry is that the Internet access service is almost 
homogeneous (Shin et al., 2007). On the other hand, the main factors that influence user preferences 
of wireless network are transmission rate, coverage, and price (Yaiparoj et al., 2008). Thus, we 
assume that customers have homogeneous valuation of V for both access services and their 
preferences are decreasingly differentiated according to transmission rate and coverage. One of the 
most important differences between WiFi and WiMAX is that the maximal transmission distances a 
WiMAX base station and a WiFi wireless router can support are 9.6 KM and 90 meters long, 
respectively. Accordingly, in a certain geographical zone served by a WiMAX base station, if the 
number of access points deployed by a WiFi service provider is insufficient, customers would bear 
transportation cost for finding the nearest access points. The expected transportation cost resulted 
from finding the nearest access points is denoted as ( )ac n , where n is the number of access points, 
and ( ) 0ac n n順 < and ( )
2 2 0ac n n順 > . 
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Table 2.  Definition of Notation 
Notation Description 
Fp  ( Mp ) The price of WiFi servie ( WiMAX service) 
dc  ( ldc ) 
The delay cost resulted from the transmission speed rate of WiFi service 
(WiMAX service) 
n  The number of access points 
( )ac n  The transporation cost resulted from finding the nearest access points 
V  The value of access services 
θ  Customer’s sensitivity to the inconveince cost resulted from coverage and transmssion rate 
0η  The number of customers who want to buy the wireless services 
Fη  ( Mη ) The demand of WiFi service (WiMAX service) 
FU  ( MU ) Customers’ utilities when using WiFi service (WiMAX service) 
Fc  ( Mc ) The service related cost of WiFi service (WiMAX service) 
Fγ  ( Mγ ) The network realted cost of WiFi serivce (WiMAX service) 
μ  The service rate of a WiMAX base station 
MK  The maringal capacity cost of a WiMAX base station 
λ (b ) Customer’s arrival rate (usage rate) 
d  The threshold of average delay in WiMAX netowrks 
w  The wholesale price per WiFi customer 
As for transmission rate, although WiFi technology typically provides local network access for 
around a few hundred feet with speeds of up to 54 Mbps, the real transmission rate is limited to fixed 
backhaul. Because the cost of fixed backhaul is expensive, most of the WiFi access points, in practice, 
are connected to T1 lines (or other media with lower transmission rates) which have a transmission 
speed rate of 1.5 Mbps. On the other hand, WiFi and WiMAX adopt different channel access methods 
for shared medium networks. Because WiMAX technology operates in TDMA (Time Division 
Multiple Access), it can provide better QoS than WiFi technology operating in CSMA/CA (Carrier 
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance). With TDMA, WiMAX can serve real-time traffic 
for customers and guarantee its service level (i.e., the delay time), while most of the WiFi access 
points around the world, in general, only serve best effort traffic. The reason of serving best effort 
traffic is that customers may randomly enter and exit access points. Due to the characteristics of best 
effort traffic, the delay time customers suffered from WiFi technology is affected by many external 
factors, such as whether the access point is located at a prosperous and bustling area. 
As compared to WiFi, because the WiMAX provider can deploy a singe WiMAX base station to 
serve customers at a wider range than WiFi, the cost of fixed backhaul can be reduced down; 
consequently, the WiMAX service provider can offer real-time traffic by connecting its base stations 
to high speed fixed backhaul, such as a T3 line which has a transmission speed rate of 44.736 Mbps. 
Therefore, in the present model, we consider that the WiFi service networks serve best effort traffic 
and the WiMAX service networks serve real-time traffic. As customer may expect to experience low-
speed WiFi services and prior study have supported the aspect that a mobile Internet service will be 
mainly used for low bandwidth applications (Ooteghem 2009), we use dc to estimate the delay cost of 
WiFi. The assumption is reasonable because nearly all WiFi service providers, such as T-Mobile and 
Boingo, have never mentioned the transmission rate in their web pages. The delay cost of WiMAX is 
denoted as ldc for real-time traffic, where ld dc c< . 
Because customers have heterogeneous sensitivity to the inconvenience cost resulted from short 
coverage and low transmission rate, we follow prior study (Chuna and Kim 2005; Fan et al. 
2007−2008; Fan et al. 2009) to denote the inconvenience cost sensitivity asq , which is randomly 
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drawn from a uniform distribution with support on[ ]0,1 . Customers choose the two access services 
based on price, coverage, transmission rate, and their own sensitivity to the inconvenience cost. A 
customer’s utilities are ( )M M ldU V p cq q= - - and ( ) ( )( )F F a dU V p c n cq q= - - + for using 
WiMAX service and WiFi service, respectively. Since the difference in transmission rate between 
WiMAX networks serving real-time traffic and WiFi networks serving best effort traffic is rather 
large, we may consider WiMAX technology a benchmark for mobile Internet services and normalize 
it as zero for simplicity. In fact, many businesses have regarded WiMAX technology as a standard-
based technology that enables the delivery of “last mile” wireless broadband access (Gunasekaran and 
Harmantzis 2008). While the setting 0ldc = is mainly for analytical convenience, it can be applied to 
the case in which the difference in transmission rate between two access services is very significant.  
A customer is indifferent between the two access services if M FU U= holds. Solving the 
equation leads to ( ) ( )( )M F a dp p c n cq
* = - + , which is the indifferent point for customers. 
Therefore, the demands for the WiFi service and WiMAX service are 0Fh q h
*= and ( ) 01Mh q h*= - , 
respectively. According to the comprehensive study conducted by Ooteghem et al. (2009), operational 
expenditures for a wireless access network can be split between network related and service related 
costs. The service related cost is composed of service provisioning and customer relationship 
management (CRM), consisting of pricing & billing, helpdesk, and marketing. We denote Fc as the 
service related cost of WiFi service and Mc as the service related cost of WiMAX service. On the other 
hand, both access services have much difference in the network related cost, including operations, 
administration, and maintenance. 
First, the network related cost of the WiFi service increases with the number of access points, 
while the one of the WiMAX service increases with the number of users as WiMAX networks serve 
real-time traffic. Second, because the WiMAX service uses licensed spectrum to deliver a point-to-
point connection to the Internet, the WiMAX service provider has to pay a license fee to broadcast 
WiMAX signals. Third, according to the chosen media, such as T1 and T3, the costs of fixed backhaul 
are also different. Each access point, i.e., a wireless router, has to been connected with respective 
fixed backhaul to offer Internet connection. In addition, both service providers bear the cost for site 
rental which is the multiplication of the number of sites with the cost per site to rent (Ooteghem et al. 
2009). Because WiFi networks serve best effort traffic, the total capacity cost is given by Fn K⋅ , 
where FK is the capacity cost per access point. Therefore, the WiFi service provider’s profit 
function Fπ can be written as: 
( )F F F F Fp c nπ η γ= − − ⋅          (3.1) 
where T1F F FRent Kγ = + + . 
On the contrary, the WiMAX service provider needs to consider the queuing delay and the 
processing rate for access services. Here, following prior study, we use M/M/1 queue to formulate the 
average delay for a customer, which can be represented as ( )1w m l= -  wheremis the service rate 
and l is customer’s arrival rate (Tan and Mookerjee 2005). Therefore, the total capacity cost of 
WiMAX can be represented by MK μ⋅ . In order to serve real-time traffic in WiMAX networks, the 
maximal average delay cannot be higher than a specific threshold d . Therefore, the WiMAX service 
provider’s profit function Mπ can be written as: 
( ) ( )
1. .
M M M M M Mp c K
s t d
π η γ μ
μ λ
= − − +
≤
−
        (3.2) 
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where T3M MRent Licenceγ = + + . 
Although the total number of customers subscribing the WiMAX service is Mη , at  any time, 
only a portion of all the customers use the access service. Letting b be the average usage rate of all the 
customers, we have Mλ βη= . Furthermore, given arbitrary Mp , the WiMAX service provider can 
optimize its profit by choosingμ as follows. 
1
M d
μ βη= +            (3.3) 
Proposition 1. (Scenario I) The capacity investment made by the WiMAX provider may increase in 
the usage rate; however, when the portion of all the customers using the WiMAX service at any time 
is too large, the WiMAX provider would reduce the capacity investment if capacity cost is expensive. 
Formally, 0μ β∂ ∂ > when β β ∗<  and 0μ β∂ ∂ < when β β ∗> , where β ∗ is given by 
( )( )( ) ( )2 2a d M F Mc n c c c Kβ ∗ = + − + .       (3.4) 
When the usage rate becomes higher, it is intuitive that the WiMAX provider would provide 
more capacity to attain the delay guarantee. Nevertheless, when the average usage rate is too high, the 
capacity cost to guarantee service delay is so expensive that the WiMAX provider has incentive to 
reduce capacity and charge customers a higher service fee to decrease the demand of WiMAX service. 
In practice, WiMAX equipment is rather expensive and the total investment is even larger for a single 
WiMAX base station than for the high number of WiFi access points (Ooteghem et al. 2009). Thus, 
the government should take account of the possible outcome and compensate the WiMAX service 
provider to optimize the social welfare of wireless access services when the average usage rate 
becomes higher. The relationship between the average usage rate and processing capacity (WiMAX’s 
price and demand) is shown in Figure 2. For convenience, all results are scaled but the qualitative 
results are unchanged. 
3.2 Optimal WiFi Coverage 
Subsequently, we consider the question of how a WiFi service provider decides the number of 
access points in a long-term competition. The game has two stages: (i) the WiFi service provider 
decides the number of access points; and (ii) both service providers simultaneously decide their prices. 
Because we have known the equilibrium prices, we can only solve the first stage of the game. Thus, 
the WiFi service provider’s problem is 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. .






F F F F Fn
a d M M F
M
a d M M F F
F
Max p c n
s t
c n c c K c
p n Min V




= − − ⋅
+ + + +⎧ ⎫
= ⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
+ + + +⎧ ⎫+
= ⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
     (3.5) 
Proposition 2. When the capacity cost of WiMAX is not too high and the difference between the two 
service related costs is not too large, the coverage investment made by the WiFi provider may 
decrease with customer’s valuation of access services, but may increase with the service related costs, 
the delay cost of WiFi service, average usage rate, and the marginal capacity cost of WiMAX service. 
Formally, when M dK c< and M Fc c≈ , the optimal n is given by 
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( ) ( )3 2 2
d M M F
a
V c c K c
c n
β∗ − + + −= , and       (3.6) 
we have 0n V∗∂ ∂ < , 0Mn c
∗∂ ∂ > , 0Fn c
∗∂ ∂ > , 0dn c
∗∂ ∂ > , 0n β∗∂ ∂ > ,and 0Mn K
∗∂ ∂ > .  
Before the WiMAX provider enters the market, the WiFi service provider would provide rather 
high number of access points to satisfy customer requirements. Once the WiMAX service becomes 
mature, the best strategy for the WiFi service provider is to reduce the number of access points. When 
the transportation cost resulted from finding the nearest access point becomes higher, the WiMAX 
service provider can raise the price of its service so that the WiFi service provider can also does to 
enhance the profit. The strategy of reducing WiFi coverage works until the WiMAX service provider 
raises its service price up to customer’s valuation of access services. Thus, the optimal number of 
access points would decrease with customer’s valuation of access services, but increase with the other 



























Figure 2. The relationship between usage rate and 
processing capacity (WiMAX’s price and demand) 
Figure 3. The relationship between # of access 
points and wholesale price (WiMAX’s profit) 
4 Bandwidth Sharing 
Currently, there is much technology study focusing on the development of integration of WiFi 
and WiMAX. In the section, we consider the business model in which the WiMAX service provider 
sells extra bandwidth to the WiFi service provider by providing wireless backhaul support and then 
the WiFi service provider can save the cost of wired infrastructure. The WiMAX service provider 
may charge the WiFi service provider a wholesale pricew per WiFi demand. Thus, the WiFi service 
provider’s problem can be rewritten as 
( )
F
FI F F F FIp
Max p c nπ ω η γ= − − − ⋅         (4.1) 
where FI F FRent Kγ = +  
On the other hand, the WiMAX service provider can receive the revenue of bandwidth sharing 
from the WiFi service provider. In the case, in addition to all customers who subscribe the WiMAX 
service, the WiMAX base station also serves real-time traffic for each WiFi access points to provide 
wireless backhaul support instead of wired backhaul support like T1. The WiMAX service provider’s 
problem can be rewritten as 
( ) ( )
1. .
M
MI M M M M M Fp
Max p c K
s t d
π η γ μ ω η
μ λ
= − − + + ⋅
≤
−
      (4.2) 
657
In addition to the usage rate derived from the customers who subscribe the WiMAX service, the 
customer’ arrive rate of a WiMAX base station has to involve the expected number of access points 
requesting Internet connection, which is given by 
( ) 1, 1 1
F
FH n n n
β η
βη
⋅⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞= − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
        (4.3) 
When the number of customers in the market is sufficiently large, we can directly approximate 
( ), FH n βη as the number of access points. Thus, given arbitrary Mp , the WiMAX service provider 
would maximize its profit by choosing capacity as 
1
M n d
μ βη= + +           (4.4) 
By the same approach mentioned in Proposition 1, we can have ( )Mp ω∗ and ( )Fp ω∗ . As a result, the 
problem of choosing an optimal wholesale price is given by 
( ) ( )( )










a d M M F
M




c n c c K c
p Min V










⎧ ⎫+ + + + +⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫+ + + + + + +⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
    (4.5) 
Proposition 3. (Scenario II)  
The optimal wholesale price charged by the WiMAX service provider may decrease with the usage 
rate. Formally, 0w b*順 < . 
When one service provider raises its price, the other would also adopt the same pricing strategy 
until customers cannot afford to to pay such a high price. As a result, when the wholesale price is not 
too large, the WiFi service provider can always raise its price to offset the loss resulted from the 
wholesale price charged by the WiMAX service provider. Accordingly, the situation of bandwidth 
sharing would hurt consumers and lead to higher prices. Examining the profit of the WiFi service 
provider, we find the business model of integration cannot benefit the WiFi service provider in most 
of cases. The case of FI Fπ π> only arises when the usage rate is between a specific range of two 
close values and the cost of T1 is very expensive; thus, in the following, we examine the relation 
between WiFi coverage and the wholesale price when FI Fπ π= holds. 
Corollary 1. In general case, the WiMAX service provider would raise the wholesale price when the 
number of access points increases. Formally, 0nω∗∂ ∂ > when FI Fπ π= . 
A scaled numeral example is shown in Figure 3 where the WiMAX profit without bandwidth 
sharing and with bandwidth sharing are denoted as ( )1Mπ and ( )2Mπ , respectively. Without 
bandwidth sharing, we find that the WiMAX service provider’s profit may decrease with WiFi 
coverage; however, its profit may increase with WiFi coverage when the WiMAX base station serves 
as the wireless backhaul for the access points in WiFi networks. 
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5 Channel Collaboration 
Subsequently, we consider the scenario in which both service providers can reach an agreement 
to collaborate in the wireless service market and split the collaborating profit. The channel 
collaboration problem without bandwidth sharing can be formulated as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( )
1. .
M F M M M F F F M M Fp c p c K n
s t d
π η η γ μ γ
μ λ
+ = − + − − + − ⋅
≤
−
     (5.1) 
, whereμ is given by (3.3). The channel collaboration problem with bandwidth sharing can be derived 
from (4.6) by replacing Fγ with FIγ and consideringμ from (4.4). 
Proposition 4. (Scenario III and IV) 
1. Without bandwidth sharing, the WiMAX capacity in channel collaboration is more than that in 
channel competition.  
2. If channel collaboration with bandwidth sharing is more (less) profitable than that without 
bandwidth sharing, the optimal coverage of the WiFi service in the former setup is higher (lower) than 
that in the latter setup. 
Because the demand of the WiMAX service in channel collaboration is higher than that in 
channel competition, the WiMAX service provider has to raise the amount of capacity to fit the 
requirement of real-time traffic. In addition, in channel collaboration, whether the WiMAX base 
station should share bandwidth for the access points in WiFi networks would depend on the saved 
cost of T1 and the marginal cost of the WiMAX capacity. When the saved cost of T1 is higher than 
the marginal cost of the WiMAX capacity, bandwidth sharing benefits channel collaboration; thus, the 
WiFi service provider can increase the number of access points to raise the collaborating profit in the 
case. 
6 Conclusion 
In the present research, we consider a wireless service zone in which there are two wireless 
service providers operating different technology, WiFi and WiMAX. The aim of the study is to 
examine the impact of the integration of WiFi and WiMAX on wireless operators’ service strategies. 
Several emerging study has focused on the pricing issue of bandwidth sharing between WiFi and 
WiMAX networks; however, most of them either concentrate on the design of collaborated protocols 
or figure out the issue without the consideration of customer preference. Comparing with prior study, 
the present study applies a wholesale price contract to solve the issue of bandwidth sharing; thus, our 
analytical results based on the aspect of enterprise operations can serve as an important reference for 
the current wireless operators. 
 In the future research, we would relax the normalized assumption of the delay cost of WiMAX 
networks and consider it the function of the average gauranteed delay. Consquently, the WiMAX 
servie provider can change the tranmssion rate of real-time traffic to optimize its profit. In addtion, we 
would consider the impact of bargaining power on the wireless operators’ service straetgies. In the 
present study, since the WiMAX service provider holds the bargaing power so that the WiFi service 
provider cannot gain substatinanl benefit from bandwidth sharing. We plan to examine how the 
bagaining power held by the wirelss operators affects their service strtegies. 
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